



The Best Way to Catch a Thief

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- Director, Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd
 - Specialist Security Company based in Australia
 - Creator of “Threat Analytics”
 - CREST Australia Tech Lead, Assessor, Board of Directors
- Black Hat
 - “Practical Threat Intelligence” Training
 - “The Shellcode Lab” Training
- Security Researcher
 - Black Hat Reverse DNS Tunneling Shellcode
 - Core Impact “DNS Channel” Shellcode
 - BeEF Bind Shellcode
- Author
 - Hacking Exposed Linux 3rd Edition



What are we doing here?



- Investigate modern security controls and techniques to detect threats, attacks and security breaches
- Discuss areas within these security controls and techniques that often fall short or fail, leaving you exposed, and how to close this gap



The Evolution of Security



- How have threats evolved?
 - How have attacks changed?
 - How has exploitation changed?
 - How have attackers changed?
 - How have backdoors changed?
 - How have hacker targets changed?
- Has your security evolved to detect and protect against these changes?
 - In most cases, probably not ... or not enough, as we will see



Threat Detection



- To detect a threat in an effective way, we must:
 - Have a clear model that maps who our threat actors are
 - The intent of these threat actors
 - The types of attacks they are likely to perform
 - The techniques to exfiltrate our data or escape our containment measures
 - What pieces of digital DNA that we need to aggregate, correlate and analyze
 - What analysis we need to do to detect these threats
- We often think that we are finished, but in reality this is just the start



Threat Actor Model



- Who are the key Threat Actors for your organization?
- External
 - Script Kiddies
 - Hacktivists
 - Cyber Criminals
 - State Sponsored Attackers
 - Cyber Terrorists
- Internal
 - Rogue Employees or Contractors
- Partners
 - Managed IT (Security) Providers
 - Offshored Development
 - Building Management



Threat Actor Intent



- What are the Critical Assets and Impacts for your organization?
- Confidentiality
 - Hacktivists leak usernames and passwords (\$188 per PII record / avg of \$5.4M)
 - Cyber Criminals steal credit card details
 - Cyber Terrorists steal designs for critical infrastructure
 - State Sponsored Attackers steal intellectual property or secret identities
 - Managed IT Provider used as a pivot point into your organization
 - Offshored Development steal intellectual property



Threat Actor Intent



- What are the critical assets and impacts for your organization?
- Integrity
 - Script Kiddies deface eCommerce website leading to loss of revenue
 - Cyber Terrorists inject invalid data into systems to trigger unwanted actions
- Availability
 - Cyber Terrorists perform denial of service attacks on critical infrastructure
 - Loss of power, water, transport, health services, etc
 - Cyber Criminals perform denial of service attacks on financial services
 - Prevent ability to transact for extortion



Threat Actor Attacks



- What are the Threat Scenarios the Threat Actor is likely to carry out?
 - Script kiddy exploits malicious file upload within eCommerce website
 - Hacktivist exploits SQL Injection to dump credit card details
 - Cyber Criminal performs DDoS attacks on financial services for extortion
 - Offshored Development steal and sell source code to critical applications



Threat Actor Attacks



- What are the Threat Scenarios the Threat Actor is likely to carry out?
 - Managed IT Provider compromised to hijack DNS and MITM communications
 - Cyber Terrorist steals designs for critical infrastructure protocols and devices
 - Cyber Terrorist injects data into SCADA systems to stop critical infrastructure
 - State Sponsored Attacker uses client-side exploit to compromise corporate network and escalate privileges to monitor activity



Threat Actor Techniques



- What are the Exfiltration Techniques used to escape your containment measures
 - Reverse TCP Connection
 - HTTP or HTTPS Tunneling
 - DNS Tunneling
 - ICMP Tunneling
 - Social Media Tunneling
 - C&C via Twitter Posts bypasses malicious domain name detection

Threat Actor Techniques



- What are the Exfiltration Techniques used to escape your containment measures
 - Cloud Services (Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive, Cloud Email)
 - Web Shell via HTTP or HTTPS
 - SQL Injection via HTTP or HTTPS
 - USB
 - Physical System Boot
 - Offshore Development and Managed IT Providers
 - Well, you basically give it to them with minimal monitoring or control

Threat Actor Indicators



- What Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) do we need to collect?
 - **Threats** – Early IOCs (*Potential Pending Attacks*)
 - Intelligence Gathering
 - Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
 - Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
 - Internal Intelligence
 - New vulnerability or exploit released for software used on your systems
 - Zero Day exploits don't provide this early indicator
 - Attacks and security breaches for other companies in your industry
 - Requires intelligence sharing across the industry
 - Malicious discussions in online forums towards the company or industry
 - Various languages across multiple countries
 - Compromised partners may indicate pending attack on your organization



Threat Actor Indicators



- What Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) do we need to collect?
 - **Attacks** – Active IOCs
 - Phishing, Spear Phishing or Drive-By Download Attacks
 - Client-side exploit attempts
 - File containing malicious Microsoft Office macro
 - Malicious Java applet
 - Sever-Based Attacks
 - Exploit scan across IP range searching for vulnerable systems
 - Small number of targeted exploit attempts
 - Web Attacks (SQL Injection, Malicious File Upload, Remote File Include, Command Injection)
 - SSL/TLS connections still often bypass detection controls



Threat Actor Indicators



- What Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) do we need to collect?
 - **Breaches** – Post Incident IOCs
 - Unexpected filesystem changes
 - DNS requests to known malicious domains
 - Connections made to known malicious IP addresses
 - Access made to critical data from account that does not typically access it
 - Local Kernel Exploits
 - Process and Thread Creation

Threat Actor Indicators



- What Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) do we need to collect?
 - **Breaches** – Post Incident IOCs
 - Process Migration
 - Service Modification or Creation
 - System file accesses searching for insecure file permissions
 - Credential and token dump / theft
 - Logins with local administrator accounts across multiple systems
 - Increased SQL queries and/or outbound data extracted



Threat Actor Analysis



- What Analysis do we need to detect the Threat Actors?
 - Map IOCs to Cyber Threat Intelligence data
 - Provides context to the IOC
 - Who is the Threat Actor?
 - What is the Threat Actor's intent?
 - What attack techniques are likely to be used?
 - What exfiltration techniques are likely to be used?
 - What privilege escalation techniques are likely to be used?



Threat Actor Analysis




- What Analysis do we need to detect the Threat Actors?
 - Data Visualization – Attack Map (Pretty-but-Useless)



Threat Actor Analysis



- What Analysis do we need to detect the Threat Actors?
 - Data Visualization – Attack Severity and Frequency over Time



Threat Detection Fails



- Missing threat detection strategy
- Inability to identify critical assets and impacts
- Out of date understanding of global threats
- Out of date understanding of industry threats
- No definition of who your primary Threat Actors are
- No definition of the various intents that Threat Actors' may have
- Assumption that internal users are all trusted
- A lack of attack knowledge to understand how Threat Actors will break in

Threat Detection Fails



- A lack of knowledge of the techniques to exfiltrate data and communications
- A lack of knowledge of security and detection bypass techniques
- Undefined Indicators of Compromise (IOC) to generate, aggregate and correlate
- Over collection of events that overwhelm Threat Analysts
- Misconfigured or ineffective security implementation / assumption it is working
- A lack of knowledge, skills, budget and resources to analyze and detect a threat
- Preference to dismiss alerts as false-positives, rather than investigate
- Lack of industry Cyber Threat Intelligence information sharing



Questions?

Thank you for attending

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